All the improvements in machinery, however, have by no means been the inventions of those who had occasion to use the machines. Many . . . have been made by the makers of the machines, when to make them $ became the business of a peculiar trade: and some by . 
Evolutionary Theory and the Innovating Firm
Attempts over the past twenty years to build an evolutionary theory of the firm have grown in part out of a dissatisfaction with the inability of mainstream theory to deal satisfactorily with two important, interrelated and empirically observable characteristics of contemporary society: continuous technical change, and the central role of the business firm in generating learning, improvement and innovation, through deliberate and purposive action. At the beginning, concepts like 'technological trajectories' and 'routines' were introduced by Nelson and Winter (1977, 1982) to reflect the cumulative and path-dependent nature of technical change, the often tacit nature of the knowledge underlying it, and the trial-and-error behaviour of business practitioners trying to cope with a complex and ever-changing world.
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Since then, two influential streams of analysis have helped deepen our knowledge of the innovating firm. First, numerous attempts have been made to apply the tools and techniques of evolutionary theory (and particularly biological evolution) directly to modelling and understanding technical change (e.g. Dosi and Marengo, 1993; Metcalfe and de Liso, 1995) . Second, numerous empirical studies have attempted to formulate generally applicable laws that explain when and why established firms succeed in innovation, and when and why they fail (e.g. Iansiti and Clark, 1994; Teece, 1996) . This paper will argue that, whilst both schools have made notable contributions to understanding of both the nature of the innovating firm and the conditions for successful innovation, much remains to be done.
Multi-technology Products and Firms
In particular, greater care and attention needs to be devoted to the distinctions between the artefacts (products, etc.) that the firm develops and produces, the firm-specific technological knowledge that underlies its ability to do so, and the organizational forms and procedures that it uses to transform one into the other. We shall argue that, in the late twentieth century, lack of technological knowledge is rarely the cause of innovation failure in large firms ' Thii paper concentrates on these aspects of firm behaviour, and not on the wider implications of evolutionary theory for the theory of the firm. For a concise evaluation of the latter, together with that of other recent theoretical developments, see Coriat and Wanstein (1995) .
based in OECD countries. The main problems arise in organization and, more specifically, in coordination and control.
This can best be understood if more attention is paid to what Adam Smith said about the division of labour, and less to what Schumpeter said about creative destruction. Smith's identification of the benefits of specialization in the production of knowledge has been amply confirmed by experience. Professional education, the establishment of laboratories, and improvements in techniques of measurement and experimentation have increased the efficiency of discovery, invention and innovation. Increasingly difficult problems can be tackled and solved.
2 Two complementary forms of specialization have happened in parallel. First, new disciplines have emerged, with all the benefits of the division of labour highlighted by Smith himself at the beginning of this paper. These specialized bodies of knowledge have become useful over a growing range of applications, so that products incorporate a growing number of technologies: compare the eighteenth-century loom with today's equivalent, with its fluid flow, electrical, electronic and software elements improving the efficiency of its mechanical functions. In other words, products are becoming increasingly 'multi-technology', and so are the firms that produce them. Each specific body of technical knowledge cannot be associated uniquely with a single, specific class of product.
3 Products and related technologies co-evolve within firms, but their dynamics are different. For example, Gambardella and Torrisi (1998) found that the most successful electronics firms over the past ten years have been those that have simultaneously broadened their technological focus and narrowed their product focus. In other cases, firms have used their range of technological skills to create or enter new product markets (see Granstrand, 1982; Granstrand and Sjolander, 1990; Oskarsson, 1993; Granstrand and Oskarsson, 1994) . Second, in addition to the benefits of the cognitive division of labour into more specialized fields, the rate of technical change has been augmented by the functional division of labour within business firms, with the establishment of corporate R&D laboratories and similar groups devoted full-time to inventive and innovative activities. In addition to the Smithean benefits of specialization, professionalization and improved equipment, these laboratories enabled firms to monitor and benefit more systematically and effectively from 2 The dassic texts on thii are Rosenberg (1974), de Soil* Price (1984) and Mowery ind Rosenberg (1989) See, for example, the reasons why problems in mechanics were solved more easily than those in medicine.
' Amongst other things, this a a source of frustration for economists who would like to match statistics on inventions from technology-based patent classes with product based trade and production statistics. See, for example, Scherer (1982) . the outside advances in specialized academic disciplines. And with growing experience in the development and testing of prototypes, they have allowed systematic experimentation with a wider range of products and processes than had previously been possible through incremental improvements constrained by established products and production lines. In fields of rich technological opportunity, firms have in consequence become multi-product as well as multi-technology.
Two Bodies of Knowledge
Hence the importance, in analysing the innovating firm, of distinguishing clearly artefacts (products) from the knowledge sources on which they are based.
4 Nelson (1998) identifies two, complementary elements in firmspecific knowledge. First, there is a 'body of understanding', based on competencies in specific technological fields, and reflected in the qualifications of corporate technical personnel, and in the fields in which they patent and publish. 5 The second element is what Nelson (1998) calls a 'body of practice', related to the design, development, production, sale and use of a specific product model or a specific production line. This firm-specific practical technical knowledge is often obtained through the combination of experimentation, experience, and information and other exchanges amongst different parts of the organisation. 6 As such, it is an organizational task, so that 'a body of practice' consists largely of organizational knowledge that links 'a body of understanding' with commercially successful (or, more broadly, useful) artefacts. ' The difference between the two forms of knowledge isnicelyillustratedin the following passage from Iansiti and dark (1994), in relation to the firm-specific capabilities for the design and development of dies used in the production of body panels for automobiles: The knowledge that underlies that capability includes an understanding of metallurgy, the flow of metal under pressure and che relationship between the characteristics of the material, the forces and pressures applied to the material and the surface properties that result. These kinds of knowledge pertain to the fundamental properties of the die and its production system. But the firm must also have knowledge about how the fundamental concepts can be operationalised into effective actions. These include knowledge of techniques of die design, die modelling, die testing and finishing, for example. Additionally, knowledge can take the form of the skill of die designers in anticipating processing problems, customised software that allows for rapid and effective testing, patterns of communication and informal interaction between die designers and manufacturing engineers that allow for early identification of potential problems, and an attitude of co-operation that facilitates coordinated action between the die designers and the tool makers that will build the dies. These elements (and many others) define an organisational capability for die design and development' (p. 560).
Method
The starting point for our analysis is the large, multi-divisional manufacturing firm, with established R&D activities and a product range that has grown out of a common, but evolving, technological competence. In part, this reflects the focus of this author's recent research (Patel and Pavitt, 1997; Tidd et al., 1997) . More important for the purpose of this paper, large multi-divisional firms are the largest single source of the new technological knowledge on which innovation depends. They perform most of the R&D activities, employ most of the qualified research scientists and engineers, perform and publish most of the corporate basic research, and maintain the closest links with academic research (Hicks, 1995) . They also contribute to the development of knowledge and products for their suppliers of production equipment, components and software (Rosenberg, 1963; Patel and Pavitt, 1994) . Finally, even when they fail in innovation themselves, they remain the major source of the technological and other competencies which enable new firms with different organizational approaches to succeed. Understanding the reasons for their success and failure therefore has the widest implications, not only for their managers, but also for the distribution of innovative activities amongst companies of different sizes and ages. It is not the main concern of this paper to argue in general for or against the large firm's ability to sustain radical innovation, but to understand better the reasons for its success and failure in trying to do so. 7 We divide our analysis into four parts, reflecting four mechanisms identified by earlier analysts of the innovating firms: competition, cognition, coordination and control.
8 Table 1 sets out schematically how the division of labour, both in knowledge production and in corporate innovative activities, has influenced these four mechanisms. We argue in Section 2 that failure to distinguish between technologies and products has led to confusion in evolutionary 
Competitive Mechanisms and Technological Diversity
It is around the notion of diversity 9 that the distinction between technologies (bodies of understanding) and products (bodies of practice) is most confused -and potentially most misleading, given the central importance accorded to diversity in the evolutionary theory of technical change. 10 In recent research undertaken at SPRU on the technological competencies of the world's largest firms, we have used the level and distribution of corporate patenting by technical field as a measure of the corporate body of technological understanding (Patel and Pavitt, 1997; O. Marsili, in preparation) . This showed that technological diversity is prominent in some dimensions, but virtually absent in others.
• Large firms are active in a range of technologies broader than the products that they make. This reflects the multi-technology nature of their products, and the knowledge required to coordinate in-house product innovation with innovation in related production systems and supply chains. What is more, the range of technological competencies mastered by large firms is increasing over time, as new technological opportunities emerge.
• There is high diversity amongst large firms in the level and mix of their technological competencies, depending on the products that they produce. These largely sector-specific mixes of technological competence change only slowly over time, again in response to changing technological opportunities.
' A reading of the Oxford Oman English Dictionary suggest! that the term 'diversity' is interchangeable with 'variety' and 'heterogeneity'.
There is low diversity in the level and mix of technological competencies amongst large firms producing similar products. What is more, the degree of technological diversity is lowest in the product fields with the highest rate of technical change: computers and pharmaceuticals.
In other words, for the individual firm, technological diversity gives it the basis to make and improve its products. For the economy as a whole, more diversity amongst firms in their mixes of specialized technological knowledge enables them to explore and exploit a fuller range of product markets. But at the level of the product market or industry, there is similarity rather than diversity in the level and mix of technological activities in competing firms, and especially in those with high rates of technical change. Technological diversity is certainly not a characteristic of competition amongst innovating firms.
11 The diversity exists downstream in the body of practice, namely the product and process configurations that can be generated from the same or very similar base of technological knowledge. We know that some of these configurations do not work out technically, and many more do not work out commercially (Freeman and Soete, 1997) . What emerges is a world where firms with broad and stable bundles of technological competencies have the capacity to generate and experiment with a range of product (and process and service) configurations, some of which succeed, but many of which fail.
At any given time, advances in some fields of technology open major opportunities for major performance improvements in materials, components and subsystems (e.g. economies of scale in continuous processes, economies of miniaturization in information processing). The directions of these improvements are easily recognized, even if they require the commitment of substantial resources for their achievement, e.g. Moore's Law in semiconductors.
12 Thus, experimentation and diversity do not take place between different technologies. On the contrary, rich and well-known directions of " A (frivolous) translation of these results into biological evolutionary terms might be (i) species need a range of genetic attributes for survival; (ii) since they live in different parts of the forest, the elephant and the mouse have different genetic mixes, which change only slowly; (iii) there is little room (or need) for genetic deviance when things are changing fast (and in predictable directions-see below). 13 Recent comments by an IT expert make the point nicely: 'Precious little has happened in digital technology over the past five years. ... Steady increases in processor speed and storage size have become as predictable as a child's growth. . . . Just as the computer industry is predicated on Moore's Law-that chips will double in speed every 18 months, which companies can literally plan on-the telecom industry can be predicated on the transparent network. . . . Change a routine and uneventful. . . . The fiber-optic backbone has joined the microprocessor on a steady predictable dimb. Processing speeds will double every 18 months. Bandwidth will quadruple every two yean. Corporate planners can rest easy' (Steinberg, 1998, pp. 80-84). In our framework, the conclusion of the hut sentence does not follow from the preceding analysis. Such rapid if predictable change in underlying technology is bound to create a plethora of difficult-to-prtdict products and services. improvement in underlying technologies 13 create opportunities for diversity and experimentation in product configurations. Technological opportunities create product diversity. There is no convincing evidence that technological diversity creates product opportunities. The central importance of firm-specific technological competencies has led some analysts to place technological discontinuities (i.e. major technological improvements) at the heart of the theory of the innovating firm. In particular, they argue that such discontinuities may either enhance established competencies and strengthen incumbent firms, or destroy established competencies and undermine them. Again, it must be stressed that technological discontinuities are not the same as product discontinuities, even if they are often treated as such. For example, perhaps the most influential paper on discontinuities by Tushman and Anderson (1986) talks of technological discontinuities in its title, whilst the basis for its empirical analysis are new products and processes (e.g. jet engines, oxygen steel-making).
Although they may have revolutionary effects, technological discontinuities rarely encompass all-or even most of-the fields of knowledge that feed into a product. Typically they may affect the performance of a key component (e.g. transistors vs. valves) or provide a major new technique (e.g. gene splicing). But they do not destroy the whole range of related and complementary technologies (e.g. sound reproduction in radios, memories in computers, molecular design in pharmaceuticals) that are necessary for a complete product.
15 Indeed, they create opportunities for product 'discontinuities' that often can be achieved only through improvements in complementary but long-established technologies (e.g. metal tolerances and reliability for robots). Furthermore, as Gambardella and Torrisi (1998) have shown, corporate technological dynamics can have different dynamics from corporate product dynamics, with technological diversification going hand in hand with increasing product focus: for example (i) when a technological discontinuity is incorporated in a product family at the mature stage of its product cycle; or (ii) when a technological discontinuity provokes the emergence of radically new but technology-related product markets with different-but as yet ill-defined-characteristics; this is probably the case in the electronics industry studied by Gambardella and Torrisi (1998) .
Finally, it should be noted that the predominance given to revolutionary technologies in the destruction of corporate competence has often been associated with the notion of paradigm shifts in technology (Dosi, 1982) , similar to those in science (Kuhn, 1962) . But this is a misinterpretation of the notion of paradigm. A new paradigm does not discredit and displace all the knowledge generated in the earlier paradigms, but instead adds to them. Newtonian physics still has major theoretical and practical uses, and at least a quarter of all the new technology created today is still in mechanical engineering. The development and commercial exploitation of technological discontinuities turns out to be a more cumulative process than is often supposed.
Certainly, there are many historical examples of firms that have failed because they did not master major emerging fields of technology (Cooper and Schendel, 1976) . But competence-destroying technologies are the exception rather than the rule today, especially amongst large firms, who have demonstrated a strong capacity through their R&D departments to acquire and develop competencies in 'discontinuity-creating' technologies like computing and biotechnology (Patel and Pavitt, 1997) . The key factors behind the success and failure of innovating firms must be sought elsewhere, in the organizational processes linking technologies, products, their production and their markets.
Cognitive mechanisms also underlie the taxonomy of innovation proposed by Abernathy and Clark (1985) , which distinguishes four types: incremental, component, architectural and revolutionary. Based on an analysis of innova-tion in photolithographic aligners, Henderson and Clark (1990) argued that innovations in product architecture 16 destroy the usefulness of the architectural knowledge in established firms, and this is difficult to recognize and remedy. More recently, and based on analysis of innovations in computer disk drives, Christensen and Rosenbloom (1995) concluded that architectural innovations do not necessarily destroy established competencies. What does is a change in the 'value network' (i.e. user market) of the innovation.
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Whilst these studies throw interesting and important light on innovation processes within firms, they must be interpreted with care. An alternative reading of the Henderson and Clark story is that failure has less to do with cognitive failure by design engineers to recognize the value of alternative product architectures, than with organizational factors such as the inability of design engineers to recognize signals from users or the marketing department, or the unwillingness or inability of corporate management to establish a new design team or product division. Furthermore, it may be a mistake to generalize from the experience of US firms specialized in the IT sector to firms in other sectors and countries. In contrast, for example, to Christensen and Rosenbloom's emphasis on the difficulties of US firms making computer disk drives in switching end-user markets, most of the world's leading chemical firms have been very successful in the twentieth century in deploying their techniques and products deriving from organic synthesis in markets as diverse as textiles, building, health and agriculture (Hounshell and Smith, 1988; Plumpe, 1995) .
Co-ordination Mechanisms and Learning across Organisational Boundaries
One of the most robust conclusions emerging from empirical research on the factors affecting success in innovation is the importance of coordinating learning and other change-related activities across functional boundaries (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Rothwell, 1977; Cooper, 1988; Wang, 1997) .
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Here we see the second major feature of the division of labour that is central to contemporary corporate innovative activities, namely coping with functional specialization, with the emergence of specialized departments for R&D, production, marketing, logistics, strategy, finance, etc. Such coordination cannot realistically be reduced to designing flows of codified information across functional boundaries. It also involves coordinated experimentation (e.g. new product launches), and the interpretation of ambiguous or incomplete data, where tacit knowledge is essential. As the observations of Iansiti and Clark in footnote 6 (p. 436) show, personal contacts, mobility and interfunctional teams are therefore of more central importance than pure information flows. In our present state of knowledge, effective coordination belongs in the field of practice rather than the field of understanding. Unlike purely technological processes, organizational processes are difficult to measure and evaluate, and do not lend themselves readily to rigorous modelling and controlled experiments. In addition, the coordination processes in which we are interested are complex. Experimentation and learning across critical organizational interfaces are particularly difficult when combining knowledge from different functions, professions and disciplines, each with their distinct and different analytical frameworks and decision rules-which is another reason why firms may try to compensate for greater technological complexity by greater market focus.
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In addition, the identification of the location of critical interfaces is not easy, for three reasons. First, there are potentially several such interfaces, involving a multitude of possible linkages between R&D, production, marketing and logistics within the firm, and a variety of sources of outside knowledge in universities, other firms (suppliers, customers, competitors, etc.) and other countries. Second, the interfaces that merit analysis and managerial attention vary considerably amongst technologies and products. Compare firms in Pharmaceuticals and automobiles. In the former, strong interfaces between in-house R&D and the direct output of academic research (in medicine, biology and chemistry) are essential. In the latter, they are not, but strong interfaces between in-house R&D and production are of central importance. These differing characteristics have important implications for both the appropriate organizational forms, and geographical location of corporate innovative activities.
Finally, the key interfaces for organizational learning change over time, very often as a result of changes in technology-related factors themselves. Witness the growing importance for the pharmaceutical industry of the interface with research in academic biology, the consumer market interface for producers of telephones and computers, and of interfaces with software and materials technologies for firms in virtually all sectors. One major source of failure in innovation is likely to be inadequate recognition of the importance of these new interfaces, or the inability of management to take effective action to establish them. We should look for what Leonard-Barton (1995) calls 'core rigidities', when individuals and groups with the established competencies for today's products are either ignorant of, or feel threatened by, the growing importance of new competencies.
Control Mechanisms: Matching Strategic Styles with Technologies
The lack of a one-to-one link between each product and each technology has at least two major implications for organizational practice in business firms.
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The first is that firms which master fields of rich technological opportunity are often able to develop and produce several products based on the same body of knowledge. In other words, they compete and grow through technologyrelated diversification. 21 Second, the very existence of this broadly useful knowledge means that the classic M-form organization is unable to match tidily each field of its technology to one product or to one division. As a consequence, systems of corporate control in the multi-product firm have a major influence on the rate and direction of its innovative activities. Chandler (1991) distinguishes two essential functions of corporate control: the entrepreneurial function of planning for the future health and growth of the enterprise, and the administrative function of controlling the operation of its many divisions. 22 The administrative function is normally exercised through systems of financial reporting and controls. The entrepreneurial function for technology is the capacity to recognize and exploit technology-based opportunities. This requires an ability to evaluate projects and programmes where the normal financial accounting techniques are often inoperable and inappropriate, since exploratory research programmes should be treated as options, rather than full-scale investments (Myers, 1984; Hamilton, 1986; Mitchell, 1986; Mitchell and Hamilton, 1988) . It may also require the establishment of a central corporate research programme or laboratory, funded in part independently from the established product divisions 20 For more extended discussions, see Kay (1979) , Prahalad »nd Hamel (1990), von Tunzrlmann (1995) and Marengo (1995) 21 See Rumelr (1974). Numerous examples can be found in the electrical and chemical industries. (Graham, 1986) . And it will certainly require the capacity to reconfigure the composition and objectives of established divisions in the light of changing opportunities (Prahaled and Hamel, 1990) . Different balances between the administrative and the entrepreneurial functions are likely to be appropriate to different levels of technological opportunity. In addition, the appropriate degree of decentralization of the entrepreneurial function within the corporation will depend in part on the nature of the firm's core technology. 23 The higher the costs of product development, the greater the need for central control of the entrepreneurial function. In other words, the appropriate system of corporate control will depend in part on the nature of the technology.
Thus, Table 2 suggests that firms with low technological opportunity are likely to be compatible with an emphasis on the administrative rather than the entrepreneurial function, and with more centralization with increasing capital intensity. Firms with high technological opportunities and high costs of product and process development-such as those in drugs and automobiles-are likely to be best suited to a strong entrepreneurial function at the corporate level. Those with high technological opportunities, but low costs of product development-like those in consumer electronics and the 3M Corporation-will be best served by more decentralized entrepreneurial initiative.
Table 2 also shows that there can be mismatches between strategic style and the nature of technological opportunities. For example, tight financial control and emphasis on short-term profitability do not allow investments in exploring longer-term options emerging from new technological opportunities: this is one reason why GEC in the UK and ITT in the USA have progressively excluded themselves from many high-technology markets {Economist, 1995 {Economist, , 1996 . Similarly, the characteristics of technology, and the corresponding organizational requirements, change over time. Thus, one reason for the recent deliberate demerger of ICI was the reduced technological opportunities in the previously fast-moving field of bulk chemicals (Owen and Harrison, 1995) . Similarly, the high costs of mainframe computers in the 1960s and 1970s, and their specificity to the corporate office market, imposed centralized entrepreneurship. With the advent of the microprocessor and packaged software, the costs of experimentation tumbled and new markets emerged. Mainframe firms had great difficulty in adjusting in time to the requirements of greater decentralization.
2i Marengo (1995) models learning, and comes to tome intuitively appealing conclusions about the balance between organizational centralization and decentralization. But his learning is also about changes in the environment, rather than about internally generated changes. 
Conclusions
The main argument of this paper is that-as foreseen by Adam Smithspecialization in knowledge production is a central feature of the innovating firm. It is therefore of great importance to distinguish products (and other artefacts) from the underlying bodies of technological understanding on which they are based. Although the two evolve together, they do not have the same dynamics. Inadequate care in distinguishing the two can result in mistaken policy prescriptions (e.g. Granstrand etal., 1997) . And it can lead to too much emphasis in evolutionary theorizing on the economic benefits of technological diversity, on the frequency and causes of creative destruction, and on the nature and implications of changes in technological paradigms.
The main challenge is to improve understanding of the organizational processes of coordination and control that make for a successful matching between the development and deployment of bodies of technological knowledge, on the one hand, and commercially successful (or useful) working artefacts, on the other. We have stressed that our practical and theoretical knowledge of these organizational processes are less well grounded than our knowledge of the processes of technological advance per se. This why companies with outstanding technological competencies-Xerox and IBM in the early days of personal computers, for example-failed to develop organizational forms to exploit them. Nonetheless, large firms are capable of restructuring their activities to benefit from the new technological oppor-447 tunities that they have mastered. 'Routines' can and do change. 'Creative destruction' is not inevitable. The appropriate organizational processes will depend on the characteristics of the technologies, such as their sources, the rate and direction of their change, and the costs of developing and building artefacts based on them. And since technologies vary greatly in these characteristics, and they change over time, any improved knowledge that we acquire will be highly contingent. Nonetheless, the research of Woodward (1965) and Chandler (1977) on the organizational dimensions of changes in process technologies shows that such research can make a major difference to our understanding of innovation in firms. The following avenues of research appear to be particularly fruitful:
1. Bibliometric studies and surveys that map linkages between knowledge, products and organization in business firms over a range of sectors. This is essential given intersectoral variety. The great challenge is to develop measures of organization that are conceptually clear and empirically robust. 2. Detailed studies by historians and sociologists of the interactions between the development of the technological knowledge base, and the associated artefacts that emerge from them (e.g. Constant, 1998; Stankiewicz, 1998) . 3. Case studies of the effects on firms, their organization and their products of the introduction of technological discontinuities, whether in the form of new sources of useful knowledge, or of order-of-magnitude improvements in the performance in one field. If then our analysis is correct, large firms in advanced countries will have few difficulties in mastering the new technology, resultant product discontinuities will happen only after a extended period of learning, 24 and failure is likely to result from 'core rigidities', namely resistance from established groups within the organization.
Finally, our analysis suggests that truths about the real innovating firm will never be elegant, simple or easy to replicate. It is nonetheless to be hoped that formal theorizing will try to incorporate more real-world features of the innovating firm. In particular, evolutionary economics grew out of dissatis-M See Miyazaki (1993) for an account of the extended period that Japanese firms spent learning about opto-dectronics. It might be argued thai the personal computer began with a component innovation (the microprocessor) which, after a number of complementary component innovations (e.g. memories), and architectural innovation] (internaliiing the dislc drive) and incremental improvements, created the conditions for the emergence of the revolutionary innovation that was the PC faction with mainstream formalizations of technical change. It would be a pity if it ended up going down the same path.
